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SEC REVIEW: COMFORT OR ILLUSION? 
Abba David Poliakofft 
Registration statements and proxy materials filed pursuant to 
federal securities laws undergo various types of scrutiny by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or the "Com-
mission',) to determine compliance with applicable regulations 
and forms and the adequacy of disclosures required to be made 
in such documents. The more selective review procedures pres-
ently employed by the SEC and the proliferation of litigation re-
lated to allegedly inadequate disclosures raise the issue of 
whether a clearance of that document by the SEC should be ac-
corded any evidentiary value. The author first outlines the re-
view procedures applicable to registration statements and proxy 
materials. Then the author addresses the evidentiary question, 
examining opposing viewpoints expressed by statute and through 
case law, and concludes the SEC determinations should be ac-
corded some evidentiary weight. 
If suit is filed against a company for fraud or misrepresentation 
under the federal securities laws, an unsettled and, to some, unsettling 
question often arises: to what extent may the company rely upon the 
review and clearance of its disclosure documents by the SEC as evidence 
of the adequacy of the disclosure contained therein? Part I of this article 
examines the review procedures employed by the SEC with respect to 
registration statements and proxy material. Part II critiques the two di-
vergent judicial viewpoints regarding what evidentiary value should be 
accorded the Commission's review and clearance of disclosure docu-
ments filed with the Commission. 1 
t B.A., 1973, Loyola College, Ner Israel College; J.D., 1977, University of Baltimore 
School of Law; Partner, Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoflberger & Hollander, Bal-
timore, Maryland. Mr. Poliakoff was a senior attorney in the Division of Corpora-
tion Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims all responsi-
bility for any private publication by its current and former employees. The views 
here expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect views of the Commis-
sion or of any of the author's colleagues on the staff of the Commission. 
1. The issue presented here centers on the evidentiary value of the Commission'S, or its 
staff's, determinations and actions or inaction, not on the issue of an estoppel claim 
against the Commission. It is generally accepted that, except in the case of an 
"egregious injustice," estoppel cannot be asserted against the SEC in an enforce-
ment action. See, e.g., Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 715, 
722 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1974); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 
248 (2d Cir. 1959); Klein v. SEC, 224 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1955); SEC v. Blavin, 
557 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (E.D. Mich. 1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985); 
SEC v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 97,704 (D. D.C. Nov. 28, 1980); SEC v. Cooper, 402 F. Supp. 516, 524 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); cf SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943, 955-57 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE REVIEW PROCESS 
A. Statutory Framework 
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 19332 (the" 1933 Act") is the oper-
ative section governing the registration of securities. 3 Section 5(a) pro-
vides that it is unlawful to sell, offer to sell, or send for the purpose of 
sale4 a security5 through the mails or any instrumentality of interstate 
commerce unless a registration statement6 is in effecF (or unless the offer 
or sale is made pursuant to an available exemption).8 Section 5(b)(I) pro-
hibits the transmittal of any prospectus relating to any security for which 
a registration statement has been filed, unless the prospectus meets the 
requirements of section 10.9 Section 5(b)(2) prohibits the transmittal by 
mail or in interstate commerce of any security for the purpose of sale 
2. Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa (1982 & Supp. 1987). 
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) (Securities Act of 1933, § 5). 
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982) (Securities Act of 1933, § 2(3» defines the terms "sale" 
and "sell" as inclusive of "every contract of sale or disposition of a security or inter-
est in a security, for value" and defines the terms "offer to sell," "offer for sale," and 
"offer" as inclusive of "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer 
to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value." Id. 
5. IS U.S.c. § 77b(l) (1982) (Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1» defines the term "secur-
ity" as: 
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, 
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col-
lateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, trans-
ferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of 
deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other 
mineral rights, ... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, 
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant 
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 
6. A registration statement consists of two parts. Part I, the prospectus, contains in-
formation regarding the company and the offering and is required to be delivered to 
investors at the time that any offer or sale is made. Part II contains certain other 
information required to be filed with the SEC but not required to be delivered to 
investors. Section 7 of the 1933 Act requires that the registration statement contain 
the information called for in Schedule A to the 1933 Act codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77aa (1982). Foreign governments or political subdivisions of foreign govern-
ments registering securities are required to provide the information set forth in 
Schedule B. 
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1982). 
8. Sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act provide specific exemptions from the registration 
requirements of the 1933 Act. The exemptions fall into two classes: exempted se-
curities and exempted transactions. See IS U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(2)-(a)(8) (1982) (ex-
empted securities); id. §§ 77c(a)(I), (a)(9)-(11), (b), (c), 77d(I)-(6) (exempted 
transactions). 
9. Id. § 77e(b)(I). Section 10 of the 1933 Act, governing prospectus disclosure, re-
quires that the prospectus contain the information called for by Schedule A or B, 
whichever is applicable, or such other information as the SEC requires by rule or 
regulation "as being necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors." Id. § 77j(c) (1982). The term "prospectus" is defined as "any 
prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by 
radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any 
security," excluding certain contemporaneous communications which accompany, 
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unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus meeting the require-
ments of section 10.10 Section 5(c) prohibits any offer to sell or offer to 
buy any security unless a registration statement has been filed. I I The 
1933 Act also imposes stringent liability for any false or misleading state-
ment of a material fact in the registration statement, or any omission of a 
material fact either required to be contained in the registration statement 
or necessary to make the statements contained therein not misleading.12 
follow, or refer to a prospectus, provided that the latter conforms to statutory re-
quirements. [d. § 77b(1O). 
In addition to the information required by section 10 of the 1933 Act, section 7 
of the 1933 Act empowers the Commission to prescribe further information to be 
contained in a registration statement. See id. § 77g. The Commission has promul-
gated various regulations regarding registration statements. See Regulation S-K, 17 
C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.800 (1987); Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 to .12-29 
(1987); Regulation C, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400-.499 (1987); see also 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 239.0-1 to .500 (1987) (forms prescribed under the 1933 Act). 
The purpose for prescribing this disclosure is to provide full and fair disclosure 
to the investing public; therefore, the prospectus must include all information that 
an investor would consider material to making a decision as to whether to purchase 
the securities. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1933). For a discussion 
of the contents of a registration statement and the various forms prescribed by the 
Commission, see 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE: 
LAW §§ 7.09-7.19 (1983). 
Section 1O(a)(3) requires that a prospectus be updated to provide current infor-
mation. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(3) (1982). In most cases, updating is accomplished by 
means of post-effective amendments to the registration statement. Section lO(d) 
gives the SEC the authority to classify prospectuses according to the nature and 
circumstances of their use or of the security, issue, issuer or otherwise. [d. § 77j(d). 
10. See [d. § 77e(b)(2). 
11. [d. § 77e(c). 
12. Section 11 of the 1933 Act lists those persons who may be liable to purchasers for 
any material misstatements or omissions in an effective registration statement. See 
[d. § 77k. See generally Feit v. Leasco Data Proc. Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. N.Y. 
1968). The statute also provides certain affirmative defenses to section 11 liability if 
such persons (other than the issuer) meet a specific standard of knowledge or con-
duct with respect to the material misstatements or omissions. 15 U.S.C. § 77k 
(1982). The most important defense is where such person 
had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did 
believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effec-
tive, that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission 
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make 
the statements therein not misleading. . . . 
[d. § 77k(b)(3); see also id. § 771 (any person who "offers or sells a security [in 
violation of section 5] shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from 
him, who may sue . . . to recover the consideration paid for such security with 
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon"); id. § 771 (2) (im-
posing civil liability on any person who offers to sell or sells securities by means of 
any written or oral communication containing material misstatements or omissions, 
whether or not made pursuant to a registration statement); id. § 77q (making it 
unlawful to offer or sell securities by means of fraud or misrepresentation while 
using the facilities of interstate commerce or the mails); id. § 77x (subjecting viola-
tors of the anti-fraud provisions of id. § 77q to criminal penalties). 
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B. Review of Registration Statements 
In practice, after the registration statement has been filed with the 
Commission,13 the registration statement is assigned to one of the operat-
ing branches of the Commission's Division of Corporation Finance. 14 
The Commission's staff reviews the registration statement to determine 
its compliance with the informational requirements of the 1933 Act and 
the forms, regulations and policies of the staff. After commenting on (or 
determining not to review) the registration statement, and determining 
that any amendment filed complies with the staff's comments, the staff, 
on behalf of the Commission, will issue an order declaring the registra-
tion statement effective, and the company will commence the public 
offering. IS 
The 1933 Act does not specifically provide for this type of review of 
registration statements filed with the Commission. In fact, section 8(a) of 
the 1933 Act provides that a registration statement will become effective 
automatically twenty days after it is filed with the Commission, or 
twenty days after any amendment to the registration statement is filed 
with the Commission. 16 The 1933 Act expressly envisions formal pro-
ceedings in the event the disclosure in a registration statement is deficient 
or misleading.'7 Under section 8(b) of the 1933 Act the Commission 
may issue an order refusing to permit the effectiveness of a registration 
statement if the registration statement appears to the Commission to be 
incomplete or inaccurate in any material respect. IS After the registration 
statement has become effective, section 8(d) of the 1933 Act provides 
that the Commission may issue a stop order suspending the effectiveness 
of an effective registration statement if the Commission determines that 
the registration statement includes an untrue statement of a material fact 
or fails to state a material fact required to be stated or necessary to make 
the statements in the registration statement not misleading. 19 
The Commission learned, however, in its early years soon after the 
enactment of the 1933 Act, that the formal process of challenging the 
registration statement was not the best method of policing disclosure. 
Because of the overwhelming number of registration statements which 
were filed with the Commission each year, the Commission devised the 
"letter of deficiencies" review method, later renamed the "letter of com-
ment" method, to effectuate the statutory aims of assuring full and fair 
13. See id. § 77f (procedure for filing registration statements); see also 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 230.402 - .403 (1987) (filing rules). 
14. The Commission's Division of Corporation Finance is responsible for processing 
registration statements and reports. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-1 (1987). 
15. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1982). The effective date may be sooner than the twentieth day 
after filing if the Commission accelerates effectiveness. [d.; see infra notes 28-35 and 
accompanying text. 
17. See id. § 77h(b), (d), (e). 
18. [d. § 77h(b). The Commission has never issued an order under this section. 
19. [d. § 17h(d). 
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disclosure without invoking the unduly harsh consequences of formal 
process under section 8.20 Under this method of operation, the Commis-
sion's staff reviewed the initial filing of a registration statement and is-
sued a detailed letter of comment advising the issuer's counsel of any 
deficiencies in the registration statement that the staff believed needed 
correction.21 This revised method of operation, adopted for the review of 
registration statements subject to the 1933 Act, offered a distinct advan-
tage to all parties, including the Commission's staff and public investors. 
The new technique was so successful that it received explicit congres-
sional approval by incorporation in the Investment Company Act of 
1940.22 
In 1980, the Commission refined the review process by implement-
ing a system of selective review in order to allow the Commission's staff 
to keep pace with the increasing number of disclosure documents filed 
with the Commission.23 Under this selective review system, first-time is-
20. See TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
H.R. Doc. No. 158, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1945) (using the term "letter of defi-
ciencies"); Thirteenth Annual Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1947, H.R. Doc. No. 461, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948) 
(using the term "letter of comment"). 
At about the same time, section 8(a) was amended to grant authority to the 
Commission to accelerate the effective date of registration statements and any pre-
effective amendments so that the issuer would not have to wait twenty days for the 
registration statement to become effective. Act of Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, Title III, 
§ 301, 54 Stat. 857. Initially, the securities industry lobbied in Congress to permit 
"blue chip" companies to become effective in less than twenty days by acceleration 
of the effective date. The Commission saw this as an opportunity to better effectuate 
the purposes of the 1933 Act and to perform its function more efficiently, and joined 
the lobbying effort. Id. 
21. The Commission's comments are not necessarily limited to the specific material dis-
closure items contained in or omitted from the registration statement, but also may 
refer to the form and readability of the registration statement. Expediting Registra-
tion Statements Filed under the Act, Securities Act Release No. 4970, [1961 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '1 77,705 (May 1, 1969). See generally 
Orlanski, SEC Comments on the Offering Prospectus, 17 REV. SEC. REG. 887 (1984). 
Although there are no legal consequences for failing to respond to a letter of com-
ment, the issuer's failure to respond to the letter of comment carries with it the 
implied threat of a formal stop order proceeding. Accordingly, rather than risk the 
adverse consequences of formal action, issuers will comply readily with the staff's 
comments contained in the letter of comment. 
22. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(e) (1982). Act of Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, Title I, § 8, 54 Stat. 803. 
Receipt of a letter of comment, however, is not a "right" which may be de-
manded or enforced. When a registration statement is grossly deficient or when the 
deficiencies appear to stem from a careless disregard of the statutory and regulatory 
requirements, the staff is not obligated to pinpoint each alleged inadequacy. "[T]o 
require it to do otherwise would unduly interfere with administrative efficiency and 
delay the processing of other filings that do not present comparable disclosure 
problems." Boruski v. Division of Corp. Fin., 321 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (S.D. N.Y. 
1971). In such cases, a brief letter usually is sent which merely highlights some of 
the major areas of deficiency. 
23. In a speech delivered during November, 1980, then SEC Chairman Harold M. Wil-
liams announced a change in the procedure followed by the Commission's staff with 
respect to filings made under the 1933 Act and the Exchange Act. Commission to 
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suers usually receive a full review by the Commission, while offerings by 
seasoned issuers or companies meeting certain criteria are reviewed, if at 
all, only on a selective basis. The Commission has not made public the 
criteria for determining whether the staff will review a registration state-
ment under the selective review system. 
In the course of the review process, registration statements are usu-
ally amended at least once in response to a letter of comment from the 
Commission's staff recommending corrections or clarifications. In order 
to prevent the registration statement from becoming effective in deficient 
form automatically after the twenty-day statutory period, issuers include 
a legend, referred to as the "delaying amendment," on the facing page of 
the initial filing of the registration statement.24 The delaying amendment 
Implement Changes to Reduce Delays in Processing of Registration Statements, SEC 
Reg. & L. Rep (BNA) No. 579, at A-14 (November 19, 1980). Williams stated that 
beginning November 17, 1980, the procedure formerly followed by the Commis-
sion's staff will be replaced by a system of "selective review" in order to allow the 
concentration of increasingly scarce manpower on the most high priority areas. Id. 
See generally The Division of Corporation Finance's Procedures Designed to Cur-
tail Time in Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release 
No. 5231, [1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 78,509 (Feb. 3, 1972) 
(setting forth review procedure followed formerly). No formal release on selective 
review was issued by the Commission. Although the selective review procedure has 
not been formally adopted or codified, its existence has been acknowledged by the 
Commission. See Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, Securities 
Act Release No. 6470, [1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 83,362 
(June 9, 1983) ("Staff processing of shelf registration statements is done in accord-
ance with the same selective review procedures applied to all Securities Act Fil-
ings. "). Under these procedures, the Commission's staff screens each registration 
statement filed in order to determine whether it will be reviewed. Certain 1933 Act 
registration statements are not reviewed, and in such cases, requests for acceleration 
of effectiveness are treated as a confirmation by participants in the offering of their 
awareness of their sole responsibility for the accuracy of disclosures. See Commis-
sion 10 Implement Changes to Reduce Delays in Processing of Registration State-
ments, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 579, at A-15 (November 19, 1980). 
The Commission also announced that an issuer whose preliminary proxy state-
ment or information statement has been on file for the required ten days may mail 
such materials without awaiting any notice or comments from the staff. Id. If the 
Commission's staff has or will have comments on a preliminary proxy statement or 
information statement, the staff will advise the issuer as soon as the staff determines 
that it may have comments, but in any event prior to the tenth day. If an issuer has 
not been so advised by the Commission's staff in the ten days after filing a prelimi-
nary proxy statement or information statement, the issuer may proceed without 
comments thereon. Therefore, it is not necessary to advise issuers or respond to 
issuer inquiries concerning the review status of a preliminary proxy statement or 
information statement, and the Commission's staff has discontinued the practice. 
The Division of Corporation Finance also advised that, except in cases of opposing 
solicitations, it no longer will exercise its delegated authority to grant requests for 
acceleration of the ten-day filing period under Rule 14a-6(a) or Rule 14c-5(a). /d. 
24. The delaying amendment is a notation on the cover of a registration statement pur-
suant to Rule 473 that "amends" the registration statement every twenty days, 
preventing it from becoming effective automatically by lapse of time, until the Com-
mission, the issuer and underwriters are prepared to permit the offering to com-
mence. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.473 (1987). The delaying amendment consists of the 
following language: 
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postpones the automatic effective date of the registration statement until 
the issuer has amended the registration statement to comply with the 
comments of the Commission's staff. 
C Acceleration of Effectiveness and Post-Effective Amendments 
When the issuer has finally amended the registration statement to 
the satisfaction of the Commission's staff and is ready to initiate the pub-
lic offering, the issuer will then request that the Commission "accelerate" 
the effective date of the registration statement.25 Under section 8 of the 
1933 Act, the Commission has authority to set the effective date of a 
registration statement earlier than the twentieth day after filing of a regis-
tration statement or any pre-effective amendment.26 The Commission is 
authorized also to fix the effective date of an amendment to the registra-
tion statement filed after the registration statement has become effec-
tive. 27 In practice, the effective date is accelerated to a date specified by 
the issuer by letter to the Commission received at least two days before 
the requested effective date. 
Section 8 of the 1933 Act articulates the standards to be met in or-
der for the Commission to accelerate the effective date of a registration 
statement and to fix the effective date of a post-effective amendment. Sec-
tion 8(a) provides that the Commission may accelerate the effective date 
of a registration statement, "having due regard to the adequacy of the 
information respecting the issuer theretofore available to the public ... 
and to the public interest and the protection of investors. "28 Applying 
similar standards, section 8(c) empowers the Commission to fix the effec-
tive date of a post-effective amendment "if such amendment, upon its 
face, appears to the Commission not to be incomplete or inaccurate in 
any material respect ... , [the Commission] having due regard to the 
public interest and the protection of investors. "29 In this context, the 
Commission has delineated, in SEC Rules 460 and 461, some of the fac-
tors which must be considered in determining whether the section 8 stan-
The registrant hereby amends this registration statement on such date or 
dates as may be necessary to delay its effective date until the registrant 
shall file a further amendment which specifically states that this registra-
tion statement shall thereafter become effective in accordance with Section 
8(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 or until the registration statement shall 
become effective on such date as the Commission acting pursuant to said 
Section 8(a), may determine. 
17 C.P.R. § 270.473 (1987). 
25. Acceleration is governed by 15 U.S.c. § 77h(a) (1982); see also infra notes 28-35 
and accompanying text. 
26. See id. § 77h(a). Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Commission has dele-
gated to the Division of Corporation Pinance the authority to grant acceleration. 17 
C.P.R. 200.30-I(a)(5)(i) (1987). 
27. IS U.S.C. § 77h(c) (1982). 
28. Id. § 77h(a). 
29. Id. § 77h(c). Post-effective amendments are filed subsequent to the effective date of 
the registration statement generally to disclose material changes since the effective 
date of the registration statement or to update the prospectus. Id. 
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dards have been met, principally relating to the adequacy of the 
disclosure and the dissemination of information regarding the issuer by 
means of distributing the preliminary prospectus. 30 
One factor which may be cause for the Commission to deny a re-
quest for acceleration is the existence of a current investigation of the 
issuer by the Commission pursuant to any of the Acts of Congress that it 
administers. 31 Notwithstanding any such investigation, the Division of 
Corporation Finance must make its finding under section 8, without un-
dertaking any inquiry which could interfere with an ongoing investiga-
tion, that acceleration would be in the public interest. If, however, the 
material facts of a registration statement are the subject of an active in-
vestigation, then the adequacy of the disclosure cannot be ascertained, 
and no determination can be made that the offering would be in the pub-
lic interest and that investors would be adequately protected. 
In this situation, the staff may be concerned that if the Commission 
actually takes affirmative action (i.e., signs the order of effectiveness) to 
declare the registration statement effective, then the issuer may attempt 
to use the order of effectiveness as evidence of the Commission's approval 
and as a defense in any action instituted (by the Commission or others) 
under the securities laws. The staff is therefore unwilling to sign an order 
explicitly declaring the registration statement effective. The issuer, on the 
other hand, is also placed in a dilemma: the staff is generally unwilling to 
offer the issuer comments on the adequacy of the disclosure regarding the 
investigation, even where the staff may have reason to question the dis-
closure. Comments by the staff could result in the involvement of the 
30. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.460, 230.461 (1987) (Regulation C). Rule 461 provides in part: 
Having due regard to the adequacy of information respecting the regis-
trant theretofore available to the public, to the facility with which the na-
ture of the securities to be registered, their relationship to the capital 
structure of the registrant issuer and the rights of holders thereof can be 
understood, and to the public interest and the protection of investors ... it 
is the general policy of the Commission, upon request ... to permit accel-
eration of the effective date of the registration statement as soon as possi-
ble after the filing of appropriate amendments, if any. 
l? C.F.R. § 230.461(b) (1987). The rule does provide, however, that "[a] person's 
request for acceleration will be considered confirmation of such person's awareness 
of the person's obligations under the [1933] Act," id. § 230.461(a), and sets forth 
certain instances in which the Commission may refuse to grant acceleration. [d. 
§ 230. 
Rule 460(b) provides: 
As a minimum, reasonable steps to make the information conve-
niently available would involve the distribution, to each underwriter and 
dealer who it is reasonably anticipated will be invited to participate in the 
distribution of the security, a reasonable time in advance of the anticipated 
effective date of the registration statement, of as many copies of the pro-
posed form of preliminary prospectus permitted by Rule 430 as appears to 
be reasonable to secure adequate distribution of the preliminary 
prospectus. 
31. [d. § 230.461(b)(3). 
48 \ Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
staff in the investigation or a prejudgment of the results of the 
investigation. 
In order to resolve this "standoff" and to avoid undue delay, the 
issuer can remove the delaying amendment on the face of its registration 
statement, thereby rendering the statement effective automatically in 
twenty days by operation of the statute without Commission approval. 
In that event, however, the issuer is denied the benefit of any comments 
on the disclosure and runs the risk of a stop-order32 or institution of 
other administrative proceedings against it by the Commission.33 
If the filing in question is a post-effective amendment, the Commis-
sion must make its section 8 determination in order to fix the effective 
date of such amendment. Because the twenty-day automatic effective-
ness provision does not apply to post-effective amendments,34 the issuer 
has no alternate means of having its post-effective amendment becoming 
effective. 35 
Under both of the above circumstances, the Division of Corporation 
Finance has, from time to time, requested a statement from the registrant 
which represents that the company is aware of its disclosure obligations, 
that the staff has not commented on matters under investigation, and 
that the company agrees not to assert the Commission's order of effec-
tiveness as a defense in any proceeding instituted under the federal secur-
ities laws. Upon receipt of these representations, the registration 
statement (or amendment) usually is declared effective. 
The staff's action indicates its sensitivity to the use of its order of 
effectiveness as a substantive approval of the disclosure; thus, through 
this representation letter process, the adverse effects to the issuer of a 
delayed offering caused by the investigation are ameliorated without 
placing the Commission in a potentially vulnerable legal position in con-
nection with its investigation and in any legal action subsequently 
brought against the issuer. While the staff views this procedure as pro-
phylactic in nature, and does not concede any evidentiary value of the 
review process, the use of these measures in and of itself would indicate 
the staff's recognition that some probative value may be attributed to the 
review process. 
32. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(d), (e) (1982). 
33. See id. § 77t. 
34. See id. § 77h(c); supra note 25. 
35. The problem was more acute when the registration statement covered an employee 
benefit plan filed on Form S-8 or a post-effective amendment thereto. In that situa-
tion, the employees, the primary beneficiaries of the offering, were the ones who 
suffered the adverse effects of any delay occasioned by the investigation. On Febru-
ary 22, 1980, however, the Commission promulgated new rules to provide means 
whereby all employee benefit plans filed on Form S-8 will become effective automat-
ically without staff review. Amendments to Registration Statement Form S-8 and 
Related New and Amended Rules Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act 
Release No. 6190, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 82,457 (Feb. 
22, 1980). 
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D. Review of Proxy Material 
The Commission's proxy rules, promulgated under section 14 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"),36 also envision a 
review procedure for proxy statements and other soliciting material. The 
proxy rules generally prohibit the solicitation37 of proxies38 from the 
holders of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange 
Act39 unless the solicitation is accompanied or preceded by a proxy state-
ment40 either meeting the requirements of Schedule 14A of the proxy 
rules or included in a registration statement filed under the 1933 ACt.41 
Generally, Schedule 14A requires that proxy statements disclose all 
material information necessary to enable the shareholder to make an in-
formed voting decision.42 Additionally, it requires certain information 
regarding management and a description of the matters to be voted upon 
at the stockholders' meeting.43 In the event of any false or misleading 
disclosure in a proxy statement, or any omission of a material fact re-
quired to make statements contained in a proxy statement not mislead-
ing,44 the Commission may institute an action to enjoin the use of the 
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982) (Exchange Act, § 14(a». Section 14(a) states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a 
national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or 
to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authoriza-
tion in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered 
pursuant to section 781 of this title. 
Id. The proxy rules are set forth at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240. 14a-l to . 14a-102 (1987). 
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-l(j)(1) (1987) defines the terms "solicit" and "solicitation" as 
inclusive of: 
(i) [a]ny request for a proxy whether or not accompanied by or included in 
a form of proxy: [sic1 (ii) [a1ny request to execute or not to execute, or to 
revoke, a proxy; or (iii) [t1he furnishing of a form of proxy or other com-
munication to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated 
to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy. 
38. 17 C.F.R. § 24O.14a-l(d) (1987) defines the term "proxy" as including "every 
proxy, consent or authorization within the meaning of section 14(a) of the [Securi-
ties Exchange1 Act," which consent or authorization "may take the form of failure 
to object or to dissent." Id. 
39. See 15 U.S.c. § 781 (1982). Securities registered pursuant to section 781 generally 
include securities traded on a national securities exchange and securities of issuers 
with assets exceeding one million dollars and 500 or more holders of record of a 
class of equity securities. Id. 
40. See 17 C.F.R. § 24O.141-1(e) (1987) (defining term "proxy statement"). 
41. Id. § 240. 14a-3(a). 
42. See id. § 24O.14a-101 Items 1-6, 21. 
43. See id. § 240. 14a-101 (Items 7-20). 
44. See id. § 240. 14a-9 (prohibiting false or misleading statements in proxy statements), 
which provides in part: 
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means 
of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting, or other commu-
nication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and 
in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or mis-
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proxy statement.45 More commonly, the stockholders may bring an ac-
tion to enjoin the stockholders' meeting, require a resolicitation of prox-
ies, or set aside the stockholder vote.46 
Unlike the review procedure for registration statements, the Ex-
change Act does not provide for a formal review and clearance of proxy 
statements. Rather, the proxy rules require that, except where election of 
directors and appointment of accountants are the only proposals submit-
ted to stockholders, preliminary proxy material be filed with the Com-
mission at least ten days prior to the dissemination of the definitive proxy 
statement to stockholders.47 The Commission normally does not review 
leading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or 
misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communi-
cation with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or 
subject matter which has become false or misleading. 
• • • 
Note: The following are some examples of what, depending upon particu-
lar facts and circumstances, may be misleading within the meaning of this 
section. 
(a) Predictions as to specific future market values. 
(b) Material which directly or indirectly impugns character, integ-
rity or personal reputation, or directly or indirectly makes charges con-
cerning improper, illegal or immoral conduct or associations, without 
factual foundation. 
(c) Failure to so identify a proxy statement, form of proxy and other 
soliciting material as to clearly distinguish it from the soliciting material of 
any other person or persons soliciting for the same meeting or subject mat-
ter. 
(d) Claims made prior to a meeting regarding the results of a 
solicitation. 
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1982); see also id. 78t(a) (providing joint and several liability 
for any person who directly or indirectly controls any person liable under the 1934 
Act or the proxy rules, unless the latter acted in good faith); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982 
& Supp. 1987) (providing for criminal liability for willful violation of 1934 Act). 
If the Commission believes a violation of the 1934 Act or the proxy rules has 
occurred, it may seek injunctive relief or it may seek a negotiated settlement of 
proceedings between the Commission and the alleged violator, leading to a consent 
decree under which the alleged violator agrees not to violate the proxy rules in the 
future. In a number of instances involving consent decrees, the defendant agrees to 
take steps, such as changing internal procedures, to avoid future violations of the 
1934 Act. See Hycel, Inc., Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Section 
15(c)(4), Exchange Act Release No. 14,981, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 81,676 (July 20, 1978). The Commission may also require recircula-
tion of proxy materials or a new shareholders' meeting. See Securities and Ex-
change Commission Staff Report on Proxy Solicitations in Connection with 
Compass Investment Group, Exchange Act Release No. 16,343, [1979 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 82,352 (Nov. 15, 1979) (issuers have an affirma-
tive duty to correct proxy materials which are inaccurate). 
46. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-34 (1965). The effect of Borak has 
been to make the federal courts the appropriate battleground for disputes arising out 
of proxy contests. 
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-6(a) (1987); see also Proxy Rules-Comprehensive Review, Ex-
change Act Release No. 22,195, [1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 
83,901 (July 1, 1985). The note to Rule 14a-6(f) provides: 
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all preliminary proxy statements filed with the Commission.48 If the is-
suer does not receive verbal notice from the staff within ten days after 
filing of the preliminary proxy statement, the definitive proxy statement 
may be mailed to stockholders.49 Generally, when extraordinary corpo-
rate action is proposed, the Commission will advise the issuer within the 
ten-day period to delay the mailing of the proxy statement until the 
Commission's staff has reviewed the proxy statement. 
A serious question has arisen, particularly in proxy contests, 
whether the proponent of a proxy statement and/or the staff in its review 
of the proxy statement bears any responsibility with respect to previously 
published materials used as part of the soliciting material. Rule 14a-ll (h) 
of the Exchange Act governs the use of reprints and reproductions in 
proxy contests. 50 Although there is no case law directly on this point, in 
the legislative history of Rule 14a-ll(h),51 the Commission explained 
that the publication of reprints or reproductions of previously published 
material "may involve the publication or distribution of proxy material 
which is subject to and should be filed with the Commission pursuant to 
the provisions of the rules."52 
Former SEC Chairman J. Sinclair Armstrong, in his testimony 
before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities relating to proxy contests, 
addressed the pervasive use of previously published material, containing 
critical or damaging statements, in proxy material as a character assassi-
nation tactic. 53 The Chairman stated: 
It has been the Commission's opinion and the Commission's 
position that material of this character when submitted as 
proxy material must be scrutinized and dealt with as though 
the charges made were being made directly, that the person fil-
ing is responsible for truth and accuracy, and that a person can-
not, consistent with the statute and fair administration of the 
Where preliminary copies of material are filed with the Commission 
pursuant to this rule, the printing of definitive copies for distribution to 
security holders should be deferred until the comments of the Commis-
sion's staff have been received and considered. 
48. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing selective review procedure). 
49. 17 C.F.R. § 24O.14a-6(a) (1987); see also supra note 47. 
50. Rule 14a-ll(h) of the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-ll(h) (1987), requires that the 
reprint or reproduction in soliciting material of previously published material state 
the author, name, and date of the prior publication; identify unnamed persons 
quoted in the previously published material; state whether consent has been ob-
tained for the use of such material; and state the circumstances under which any 
consideration was paid for such use. 
51. Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 5,276, [1956 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 76,380 (Jan. 17, 1956) (adopting Rule 
14a-ll(h». 
52.Id. 
53. Stock Market Study (Corporate Proxy Contests). Hearings before a Subcomm. of the 
Comm. on Banking & Currency. United States Senate, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1507, 
1553-55 (June 15, 1955) (statement of J. Sinclair Armstrong, SEC Chairman) [here-
inafter Hearings on Corporate Proxy Contests). 
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rule, do indirectly that which is objectionable if done directly. 54 
At the time of these subcommittee hearings, it was customary for the 
Commission's staff to make certain inquiries of persons filing reprints 
and excerpts from previously published materials, immediately upon 
such filing, not to pass upon the accuracy of the initial publication, but 
rather to ascertain the accuracy of the reprint. 55 
Thus, Rule 14a-ll(h) apparently was intended to codify the Com-
mission's view that the proponent bears full responsibility for the accu-
racy of the reprint as original proxy material. Accordingly, the staff 
scrutinizes the reprinted material in the same manner and for the same 
reasons as original proxy material, and requests the factual bases for the 
statements made. The staff need not question or investigate the author or 
sources quoted since they are not before the Commission and cannot 
then be required to comply with the staff's requests. The party using the 
material is the one who must ascertain the truthfulness and accuracy of 
the facts contained therein. Because it is considered original proxy mate-
rial, the proponent must take responsibility for the reprint and subjects 
himself to liability therefor under Rule 14a-9.56 
As in the case of a registration statement,57 the Commission is in a 
strained position when an issuer that is under investigation by the Com-
mission files a preliminary proxy statement. The Commission will not 
request a representation from the sponsor that it will not assert the Com-
mission's clearance of the proxy material as evidence of the proxy mate-
rial's compliance with the requirements of the Exchange Act, because, 
unlike registration statements, the use of proxy statements is not contin-
gent upon formal affirmative action by the Commission (i.e., signing an 
order of effectiveness). Nevertheless, as an added precaution, the staff 
usually will advise the issuer that it will not comment on the disclosure, 
and that the issuer must proceed on its own responsibility without the 
benefit of any comment from the staff. 58 Thus, the staff avoids any impli-
cation that it has approved the disclosure and precludes the possibility 
that its "approval" will be asserted as a defense in any subsequent legal 
proceeding. 
54. Id. at 1554. 
55. [d. at 1560. 
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-9(a) (1987). 
57. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
58. See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co. v. Jacobs, 549 F. Supp. 1068, 1076 (D. Del. 1982). In 
Pabst, the court quoted from a Commission clearance letter as follows: 
The responsibility for the form and content of the proxy soliciting 
material rests with the persons making the solicitation. The fact that such 
material has been filed with or reviewed by the staff of the Commission 
shall not be deemed a finding by the Commission that such material is 
accurate and complete or that the Commission has passed upon the merits 
of or approved any statement contained therein or any matter to be acted 
upon by security holders. 
[d. at 1076. 
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II. EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE REVIEW PROCESS 
The Commission's concern regarding the implications of its clear-
ance of a disclosure document is not unfounded. Indeed, the staff's re-
view and clearance of a registration statement or approval of proxy 
material at times has been proffered in subsequent legal proceedings as 
evidence of the company's compliance with the disclosure requirements 
and antifraud provisions of both the 1933 Act and the Exchange Act. S9 
The result has been the development of two lines of case law propound-
ing opposing viewpoints. 
A. The Commission's Position: The Strict View 
The Commission maintains that its review and clearance of disclo-
sure documents has no evidentiary value in determining the adequacy 
and accuracy of the information contained therein. In a release relating 
to curtailed review of registration statements, the Commission stated: 
Notwithstanding the type of review applied to registration 
statements, the Commission hereby again advises registrants 
that the statutory burden of disclosure is on the issuer, its affili-
ates, the underwriter, accountants and other experts; that as a 
matter of law this burden cannot be shifted to the staff; and that 
the current workload is such that the staff cannot undertake 
additional review and comments. 60 
59. In considering the impact of the Commission's review procedure, no distinction is 
made in this article as to whether the disclosure document is filed under the 1933 
Act, such as registration statements, or under the Exchange Act, such as proxy 
statements (of course, certain proxy material, such as merger proxies, are also filed 
under the 1933 Act to register shares of stock being offered in the merger). While 
one may argue that more deference should be accorded the staff's clearance of regis-
tration statements under the 1933 Act because the Commission actually issues an 
order of effectiveness of the registration statement, the contrary view may also be 
taken, i. e., that more weight should be given to the staff's review of proxy material 
since Congress did not prescribe the disclosure standard, as it did in Schedules A 
and B to the 1933 Act. Under the latter position, one would propound the theory 
that the Commission is given more latitude under the Exchange Act to set and 
adjust the disclosure standard as may be deemed appropriate by the Commission, 
and therefore the Commission's determination should be conclusive. However, as is 
evident from the cases cited herein, the courts themselves, in considering the weight 
to be accorded the staff's review, have made no distinction as to whether the docu-
ment reviewed was filed under the 1933 Act or the Exchange Act. Instead, the focal 
point is, and the author agrees that the emphasis should be, the role played by the 
Commission staff in the disclosure area generally, how that role may be perceived 
and whether it is to be relied upon. 
60. The Division of Corporation Finance's Procedures Designed to Curtail Time in Re-
gistration Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 5231, [1972 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1178,509 (Feb. 3, 1972). With respect to 
the Commission's review of proxy material, Rule 14a-9(b) provides: 
The fact that a proxy statement, form of proxy or other soliciting material 
has been filed with or examined by the Commission shall not be deemed a 
finding by the Commission that such material is accurate or complete or 
not false or misleading, or that the Commission has passed upon the mer-
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Language in both the 1933 Act and the Exchange Act supports the 
Commission's position. Section 23 of the 1933 Act specifically states that 
neither the filing nor the effectiveness of a registration statement, nor the 
fact that a stop order is not in effect with respect to the registration state-
ment, shall be deemed a finding by the Commission that the registration 
statement complies with the informational requirements of the 1933 
Act. 61 Additionally, the Commission requires each prospectus to carry a 
legend stating that the Commission has not passed on the accuracy or 
adequacy of the prospectus and that a contrary representation constitutes 
a criminal offense.62 Similarly, with respect to the Commission's review 
and clearance of proxy statements, section 26 of the Exchange Act states 
that no action or failure to act by the Commission with regard to any 
statement or report examined pursuant to the Exchange Act shall be 
deemed a finding by the Commission that "such statement or report is 
true and accurate on its face or that it is not false or misleading. "63 The 
proxy rules specifically reiterate this caveat. 64 
Many courts have followed the Commission's position and have re-
fused to accord any weight to the Commission's review and clearance of 
registration statements and proxy material. 65 This refusal is based pri-
its of or approved any statement contained therein or any matter to be 
acted upon by security holders. No representation contrary to the forego-
ing shall be made. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(b) (1987); see also In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 
648, 656-59 (1945); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.c. § 80a-34(a) 
(1982). 
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1982). 
62. 17 C.F.R. § 229.501 (1987). 
63. 15 U.S.c. § 78z (1982). 
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-9(b) (1987); see supra note 60 (quoting Rule 14a-9(b». The 
history of this disclaimer in the proxy rules is instructive. In testimony explaining 
the proxy rules before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities in 1955, then SEC 
Chairman J. Sinclair Armstrong explained the Commission's position on the Com-
mission's review of proxy statements as follows: 
Out of this administrative practice [of reviewing proxy material] has 
corne the popular notion that we "approve" ... or "clear" or "permit" the 
use of proxy material. These characterizations of our action or nonaction 
are not accurate. What actually is involved is that the staff of the Com-
mission concludes on the basis of the submitted proxy material and any 
other information available to the Commission that, on its face, there has 
not been a failure, on the part of the person who has submitted the mate-
rial, to comply with the standards of the proxy regulations. 
The Commission does not vouch for, underwrite, or defend the accu-
racy or adequacy of the proxy material. The accuracy of the statements 
made and the truth and adequacy of proxy material are the responsibility 
of the persons soliciting proxies. It is not the Commission's. At the ad-
ministrative level, at least, the burden is on the user to establish that his 
facts, arguments, and charges are true and not misleading. It is not and 
cannot be the Commission's function to prove the truth, accuracy, and 
fairness of every piece of proxy material filed with us. 
Hearings on Corporate Proxy Contests, supra note 53, at 1545-46. 
65. See, e.g., Klastorin v. Roth, 353 F.2d 182, 183 n.2 (2d Cir. 1965); Holt v. Katy 
Indus., 71 F.R.D. 424, 427 (S.D. N.Y. 1976). Contra Pabst Brewing Co. v. Jacobs, 
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marily upon the large number of disclosure documents filed each year 
with the Commission. Because this number greatly exceeds the ability of 
the Commission's staff to examine each one in detail, the Commission's 
review and clearance of each document does not reflect upon the issuer's 
compliance with federal securities laws.66 Even if the Commission had 
the manpower to examine thoroughly each disclosure document filed 
with the Commission, the Commission lacks the issuer's day-to-day fa-
miliarity with the facts, which would enable the Commission to appraise 
the truth and accuracy of the statements contained in the documents.67 
This strict view of the effect of the Commission's review was pro-
pounded by the United States Supreme Court, inJ.L Case Co. v. Borak,68 
a case in which the Court found a private right to enforcement of the 
proxy rules. The plaintiff stockholder in Borak alleged that the defend-
ant corporation had used false and misleading proxy material to obtain 
stockholder approval of a merger.69 Noting the large number of proxy 
statements filed each year with the Commission70 and that time does not 
permit the Commission to examine each proxy statement on other than 
an expedited basis, the Court stated that this time limitation "results in 
the Commission['s] acceptance of the representations contained therein 
at their face value, unless contrary to other material on file with it."71 
Consequently, the Court held that this inability of the Commission to 
review independently each proxy statement filed with the Commission 
requires that a stockholder be entitled to bring suit as a result of injury 
which the stockholder suffers from corporate action pursuant to a decep-
tive proxy solicitation. 72 
In Millimet v. George F. Fuller CO.,73 the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York broadly interpreted the 
Supreme Court's holding in Borak as mandating that the Commission's 
review of proxy material be given no weight. 74 Thus, the district court 
549 F. Supp. 1068, 1076 ("A limited exception exists, however, where the precise 
factual or legal question has been brought to the attention of the SEC prior to the 
issue of the form, and the SEC has subsequently allowed the form to be sent to the 
shareholders without modification. In that situation, the SEC's inaction may be 
accorded some weight."). 
66. See 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); Medical Comm. for Human 
Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); 
Holt v. Katy Indus., 71 F.R.D. 424, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
67. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709,721 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 
910 (1972). 
68. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
69. Id. at 432-33. 
70. Id. at 432. 
71. Id.; see also Boroski v. Division of Corp. Fin., 321 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
72. 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-33 (1964). 
73. [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 91,570 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
74. Id. at 95,156. The district court stated: 
[The proxy sponsor] argues that "great deference should be paid" by 
this Court to "clearance" of the proxy statement by the Commission .... 
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interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Borak as an endorsement of 
the Commission's position. The Millimet case is representative of the 
view that despite SEC review and clearance, a court is not precluded 
from finding a violation of the Commission's rules.7s 
B. The Broader View 
Notwithstanding the Commission's position and supporting cases, 
there is a broader view espoused by a line of cases indicating that the 
Commission's review and clearance procedures in fact carry some evi-
dentiary value, particularly where the Commission's staff has directed its 
attention to the disclosures in question.76 This view is not in contradic-
tion with the statutory disclaimers, and in fact finds its roots in the policy 
scheme of the 1933 Act and, to some extent, in the Supreme Court's 
decision in Borak. 
In adopting the strict view, the district court in Millimet relied upon 
the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Borak. The court, however, 
overlooked an essential feature of the Borak reasoning and therefore 
reached a result which is not wholly supported by the Supreme Court's 
This argument cannot be accepted. "Clearance" by the Commission ... 
[is] merely an indication by the Commission that it will take no action 
under Section 21(e) of the [1934] Act to enjoy (sic) use of the proxy state-
ment. It is specifically provided in Section 26 of the [1934] Act that failure 
of the Commission to act shall not be construed to mean any approval. 
Id. (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964»; see also Subin v. 
Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753, 774 (2d Cir.) (Medina, J. dissenting in part), cert. denied, 
350 U.S. 883 (1955). Judge Frank, concurring in part, expressed a novel approach 
apparently supporting the Commission's position and countering the defendant's 
defense that the allegedly misleading proxy materials were prepared in conjunction 
with and approved by the staff. Judge Frank wrote that "those subordinates cannot 
bind the Commission, and do not speak for it without its approval, not given here." 
Id. at 767. This line of reasoning, however, does not appear to have prevailed. See, 
e.g., Miller V. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Sherman v. Posner, 266 
F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf Spielman V. General Host Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976). 
75. See, e.g., Miller, 268 F. Supp. 255; Leighton V. One William Street Fund, Inc., 
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 91,561 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 
Subin, 224 F.2d 753 (Medina, J. dissenting in part). Judge Medina wrote in the 
Subin case: 
The Commission gave no formal approval nor was any adjudication made 
as to the sufficiency of the Statement and we agree that such participation 
in the preparation of the Proxy Statement by staff members of the SEC as 
may have taken place cannot affect the sufficiency as a matter of law of the 
allegations of the complaint. 
224 F.2d at 774. 
76. Virtually all of the cases giving weight to the staff's review involve the dismissal of 
an action for a preliminary injunction against the registrant's use of the material, 
voting of the proxies or holding of the stockholder's meeting. Plaintiffs in such 
actions bear a high burden of proof which necessitates the showing of such things as 
the likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the relief 
is not granted, and that the harm to defendants as a result of granting the relief is 
commensurate to the harm which is to be averted. Sherman, 266 F. Supp. 871; 
Mack V. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
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analysis. The strict view, upon which the Millimet holding was based, 
accorded no evidentiary value per se to the review process in general. 
However, the Borak holding was based upon a determination that the 
staff generally does not have the time or information necessary to make a 
meaningful determination. It is therefore implicit from the Borak analy-
sis that only under those circumstances (i.e., where the staff did not have 
the tools necessary to properly focus upon the issue) no inference may be 
drawn from the Commission's review. Contrary to Millimet's strict per 
se rule, the ultimate decision as to whether or not an inference may be 
drawn from the Commission's review depends on the circumstances of 
the specific case, and particularly the facts known to the Commission's 
staff at the time of its review. This feature of the Borak analysis, over-
looked by Millimet, implicitly supports a case-by-case assessment of evi-
dentiary value of the staff's review based upon whether the staff was 
aware of facts which allegedly made the disclosure document misleading. 
Courts adopting this broader view have studied such factors as the con-
spicuousness and critical nature of the particular facts in order to deter-
mine whether the staff noted such facts during the review process.77 
When it is clear that the Commission is aware of the facts in ques-
tion, and particularly when the Commission takes an affirmative position 
to support the clearance of a disclosure document, some weight should 
be accorded the staff's review and clearance of that document. 78 
Notwithstanding the strict view espoused by the Commission and the 
cases supporting it, some courts have accorded probative value to the 
staff's review and its determination of the completeness of the disclosure 
even when the staff did not specifically address or comment upon the 
item of disclosure in question. 79 Thus, the broader interpretation of 
77. See Norte & Co. v. Huffines, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
11 92,204, at 96,939 (S.D. N.Y. 1968). The court in that case noted: 
There is no indication that the SEC was aware, as were the defendants, of 
the inflation in the ... earnings figures used in the proxy solicitation mate-
rial, and it is difficult to believe that if the SEC had in fact noted the 
reference, which is buried away at the tail end of an irrelevant section, to 
the recent arm's length sale ... , it would have permitted the proxy mate-
rial to be circulated without placing that vital information where it would 
be more likely to be noted by ... stockholders. We can only conclude that 
the SEC was misled and that it failed to note the burial of this vital infor-
mation, which was not included in the initial draft submitted to it for 
clearance. 
Id. at 96,951. 
78. See Sunray OX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447, 451-52 (10th 
Cir. 1968). The Sunray case is extraordinary in the sense that the Commission had 
taken an affirmative stand on the sufficiency of the disclosure in a proxy statement 
that was subject to litigation. Id. Most often the Commission is silent beyond the 
order of effectiveness or the informal review and clearance of a proxy; it is in these 
instances when the question regarding the degree of comfort available to the regis-
trant from the review process is most poignant. 
79. See Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), in 
which the court stated: 
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Borak has been expanded to accord some evidentiary value to the Com-
mission's order of effectiveness, in and of itself. 
Cases espousing the broader view of the staff's review function have 
also developed a new theory in support of this broad view: the Commis-
sion, which is primarily charged with the duty of protecting investors, is 
unquestionably an "expert" in these matters; therefore, its review must 
be accorded some weight in determining "the validity of [the registrant's] 
activities."so Although the staff's failure to require further clarification 
of the disclosure does not mean that no violation of the federal securities 
laws has occurred, it may indicate that the Commission finds the docu-
ment adequate for its purposes.Sl Recognizing that the review and clear-
ance of disclosure documents by the staff is not a determinative ruling on 
the merits, one court has stated that nevertheless, "it would be odd in-
deed ... that a violation of the Commission Rule [14a-9] went by unno-
ticed."82 This is particularly true when the Commission's staff possesses 
There is also the fact that the SEC pennitted the registration state-
ment to become effective. Indeed, it would be remarkable that, after Ar-
mour had pinpointed its various claims of violations of the securities laws, 
the Commission, if there were substance to any claim that remained un-
corrected, allowed the registration statement to become effective and the 
securities to be offered to the public. To be sure, the registration of the 
securities carries with it neither the approval nor disapproval of the Com-
mission. Yet, when the very charges [the] plaintiff advanced before the 
Commission are renewed on this motion and denied by the defendants, the 
SEC's clearance of the registration statement may be accorded some 
weight. 
Id. at 475 (footnotes omitted). In a related case involving the continuing saga of' 
General Host Corporation's attempted exchange offer for the shares of Annour & 
Co., Spielman v. General Host Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 
F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976), the Commission itself, rather than the Division of Corpora-
tion Finance, declared the registration statement effective notwithstanding the is-
suer's questions as to the disclosure. The court again clarified its stance as related to 
the order declaring the registration statement effective: 
While the registration of securities by the SEC does not constitute Com-
mission approval of the language of the prospectus and cannot relieve this 
Court of its duty to exercise an independent judgment on the adequacy of 
disclosure, clearance by the Commission in the face of charges identical 
with those presented here may be given some weight, and the documen-
tary evidence of arguments pressed by Annour's counsel upon the Com-
mission makes this a particularly appropriate case in which to give some 
credit to the Commission's clearance. 
402 F. Supp. at 197. 
80. Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also 601 
West 26 Corp. v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), 
aff'd, 420 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1969); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 283 F. 
Supp. 832, 835 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd, 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Kauder V. United Board & Carton Corp., 199 F. 
Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Shvetz v. Indus. Rayon Corp., 212 F. Supp. 308 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Weeks V. Alpert, 131 F. Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1955); Doyle V. 
Milton, 73 F. Supp. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). 
81. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. V. Lewis, 334 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971). 
82. McConnell V. Lucht, 320 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (S.D. N.Y. 1970). 
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some knowledge of the factual background.83 The Supreme Court's qual-
ification in Borak that disclosures are accepted by the Commission at 
face value "unless contrary to other material on file [with the Commis-
sion]"84 is consistent with this theory; the Borak analysis suggests that if 
the Commission's staff is aware of the facts in question, yet deliberately 
permits use of the disclosure document as is, the staff's determination 
has probative value. 85 
The question of evidentiary value was considered in Union Pacific 
Railroad Co. v. Chicago &. North Western Railway CO.86 from another 
angle. In Union Pacific, the Commission's staff expressed serious con-
cerns regarding the disclosures in proxy material. 87 After holding that 
the Commission's failure to bring an injunctive action did not prejudice 
the plaintiff's case, the United States District Court noted further that 
"[ w ]here, as here, circumstances assure that agency consideration has 
been given to the merits of a question, the determinations and positions 
of the responsible authorities of the SEC carry significant weight and 
command deference in the courtS."88 
C Reconciliation with the Statutory Disclaimers 
Courts espousing the liberal or broader view according evidentiary 
83. See Abramson, 312 F. Supp. 519, 526; General Time Corp., 403 F.2d 159; Mack v. 
Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Dunn v. Decca Records, 120 F. Supp. 
1 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (Kaufman, 1.); see also Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753, 767 
(2d Cir.) (Frank, 1. dissenting, but concurring with textual proposition), cert. de-
nied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955). 
84. 1.1. Case CO. V. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
85. See Kerner V. Crossman, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCCI) ~ 
91,030 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("The fact that the S.E.C. has known about the transaction 
since the clearance of the prospectus . . . and has done nothing is of some rele-
vancy. "). The issue discussed in this article is very different from the question 
raised in Dillon V. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214, 1229 (D. Del.), aff'd, 453 F.2d 876 (2d 
Cir. 1971) (involving allegedly inadequate proxy material) in which the court held 
that the Commission's failure to institute legal proceedings against the defendants 
can be accorded no weight in determining whether the proxy material in fact con-
tained inadequate disclosure. The simple distinction is that a decision to institute 
legal proceedings involves a large number of other factors not present in the context 
of a simple review of and commentary upon SEC filings, including litigation man-
power, egregiousness of the violation, geographic considerations, allocation of re-
sources based on pending caseload, and generally the totality of circumstances in 
the case. 
86. 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964). 
87. [d. at 405-07. 
88. [d. at 406. The deference accorded the staff's views is reflected by the court's state-
ments that "the violation committed here cannot be passed as mere technicality, 
since when the Report did in fact receive SEC consideration, the staff found it to be 
sufficiently objectionable to request that distribution cease." [d. at 408; see also 
Boruski v. Division of Corp. Fin., 321 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
Nevertheless, the court was unclear and seemed to imply that the staff's failure 
to comment on a filing would carry little or no weight ("This distinction between 
viewing inaction as approval and deferring to specific and particular disapproval 
finds tacit recognition in the governing act of Congress."). 
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value to the review process do not adequately reconcile that viewpoint 
with the statutory disclaimers contained in the 1933 Act and the Ex-
change Act. 89 While acknowledging these disclaimers, the courts have 
nevertheless held that some weight must be given to the staff's review 
and clearance of disclosure documents.90 
Moreover, an apparent conflict exists between the controlling statu-
tory provisions. Both section 23 of the 1933 Act and section 26 of the 
Exchange Act state that the fact that a registration statement is in effect 
should not be deemed a "finding" by the Commission regarding the accu-
racy of the statement. Nevertheless, section 8 establishes certain statu-
tory standards91 which must be met before the Commission accelerates 
the effective date of a registration statement. Furthermore, under the 
Exchange Act, the Commission's rules mandate the review of filed proxy 
statements. 
The inconsistency between the broad view and the statutory dis-
claimers was demonstrated in Schwayder v. Beatrice Foods CO.92 Re-
sponding to the plaintiff's allegation of a misleading proxy statement, 
Beatrice filed a memorandum attempting to treat the SEC's failure to 
take action to prevent distribution of Beatrice's proxy statement as evi-
dence of the adequacy of the disclosure.93 The plaintiff countered that no 
inference should be drawn from the SEC's inaction, citing Rule 14a-
9(b),94 which disavows any implication of approval by virtue of the 
staff's review and prohibits any such representation. 95 Defendant Bea- . 
trice replied, "[t]he obvious purpose of the Rule upon which plaintiff re-
lies is to prevent companies from including a legend on their proxy 
statements which denotes SEC approval. It has nothing to do with evi-
dentiary questions presented to a federal court. That is the Court's 
province. "96 
89. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
90. See, e.g., Sherman v. Posner, 266 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), in which the court 
stated: 
Notwithstanding the Commission's rules, this court is not disposed, 
as some would suggest, to completely emasculate the actions of the Com-
mission of any meaning. It is submitted that the action, or inaction, as the 
case may be, of the Commission is to be accorded some weight where, as 
in our case, the information which forms the basis for an injunctive motion 
previously has been brought to the attention of the Commission and the 
Commission has presumably approved issuance of the material. 
Id. at 874. The court merely glossed over the conflict between the liberal view and 
the statutory disclaimers without attempting to reconcile the two. 
91. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
92. No. 79-C-1850, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1979) (unpublished). 
93. Defendant's Trial Memorandum, Schwayder v. Beatrice Foods Co., No. 79-C-1850 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1979) (unpublished) (regarding relevance of SEC review and re-
lease of proxy material). 
94. See supra note 60. 
95. Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum at 2, Schwayder v. Beatrice Foods Co., No. 79-C-
1850 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1979) (unpublished) (regarding relevance of the inaction of 
the SEC). 
96. Defendant's Supplementary Memorandum at 2, Schwayder v. Beatrice Foods Co., 
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While the response of Beatrice correctly notes the inconsistency, it 
does not address the reason for the disclaimer and the prohibition against 
using the review as a stamp of approval. In order to reconcile the appar-
ent statutory inconsistency, and to reconcile the broad view with the stat-
utory disclaimers, the statutory references to the Commission's findings 
or determinations must be interpreted as referring to two different types 
or levels of findings or determinations: (1) section 8 refers to an internal 
or "lesser finding" or determination, on the one hand, and (2) section 23 
of the 1933 Act and section 26 of the Exchange Act refer to a dispositive 
determination by the Commission on the other hand. While the Com-
mission is charged with the responsibility of making some determination 
under section 8, to the best of its ability, as to whether the statutory 
standards have indeed been met,97 this is an internal determination or 
"lesser finding" made by the Commission in the performance of its duties 
under the Acts. On the other hand, the findings referred to in section 23 
of the 1933 Act and section 26 of the Exchange Act admonish that this 
"lesser finding" pursuant to section 8 should not be misconstrued as a 
dispositive finding on the adequacy of the disclosure. The reason this 
"lesser finding" may not, per se, be viewed as dispositive is because of the 
very factors described in Borak: the staff usually does not have the time 
or information necessary to make a dispositive finding. 98 Consequently, 
the Acts specifically place the burden of full and fair disclosure upon the 
registrant,99 and any representation that the Commission has made such 
a dispositive finding is unlawful. loo The question which the courts have 
struggled with is how much, if any, probative value to accord this "lesser 
finding" or "internal determination." Courts espousing the liberal view 
of the review process recognize as probative, and accord some weight, 
although not dispositive, to the Commission's actual determination re-
garding the adequacy of the disclosure. \01 
No. 79-C-1850 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1979) (unpublisbed) (proving relevance of SEC 
review and release). The suit was settled without an adjudication on the merits. 
97. The language used in Investors Research v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980), is instructive. In that case, involving a registered in-
vestment advisor providing services to an investment company registered under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, the defendants argued that the Commission 
sanctioned the disclosure in the investment company's prospectus by failing to com-
ment on the arrangement in question. The court responded that "[i)n these circum-
stances, without benefit of the additional information it acquired through its public 
proceedings, the Commission had no duty to challenge the natural implication of 
petitioners' assertion." [d. at 174 (emphasis added). The court appears to recognize 
some type of inherent duty of the staff in the review process. 
98. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 317 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
99. See Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 11, 48 Stat. 87 (codified at IS U.S.C. § 17k 
(1982». 
100. Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 23,48 Stat. 87 (codified at IS U.S.C. § 77w (1982»; 
Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 26 (current version at IS U.S.c. § 78z (1982». 
101. The prevailing sentiment of the courts justifying deference to the staff's review is 
expressed in Burke v. Wilson Brothers, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 1191,705 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1966). "Although SEC approval is by no 
means determinative and, indeed, not entitled to great weight, it is by no means 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The standards for acceleration of the effective date of registration 
statements have been mandated by statute; the review processes, both of 
registration statements and of proxy material, are firmly established in 
the Commission's rules and procedures. Judicial pronouncements have 
made clear that some evidentiary value may be and is attributed to the 
staff's determination. A logical corollary then is that the person filing 
disclosure documents should be entitled to rely upon the SEC's review 
and clearance process to the extent of the information presented to the 
staff.102 Indeed, it appears that the bar perceives the review function in 
this context. 103 It is true that the Commission does not, and should not, 
"approve" conclusively the disclosure document or the merits of the 
transaction; nor can the disclosure responsibilities be shifted to the staff. 
The full facts of each case are uniquely within the knowledge of the regis-
trant and its professional advisers. When the facts, however, are 
presented to the staff and are subject to its scrutiny, the registrant should 
benefit from the staff's objective consideration. Consequently, if the ade-
quacy of a disclosure document subsequently is questioned, the views of 
the SEC staff, as "experts" in disclosure, should be recognized to some 
extent as a legitimate source of comfort to which the registrant is 
entitled. 
entitled to no weight whatsoever. If this were the case, it is difficult to perceive what 
is gained by subjecting the proxy statement to SEC scrutiny in the first place." Id. 
at 95,595, n.3. 
102. It is noteworthy that the staff takes this position in practically all no-action and 
interpretive letters by the Division of Corporation Finance. At the end of each 
letter the following caveat appears: 
Because this position is based upon representations made to the Division 
in your letter, it should be noted that any different facts or conditions 
might require a different conclusion. 
103. In Schwayder v. Beatrice Foods Co., No. 79-C-1850 (N.D. Ill. Aug. I, 1979) (un-
published), the Commission approved the original proxy statement, then asked to 
meet with Beatrice officials, informing Beatrice that the proxy statement "may be 
misleading." The judge noted that "the SEC is setting a very bad precedent .... 
[Y]ou ought to know whether you can rely on the SEC's approval and disapproval." 
Wall Street Journal, May 15, 1979, at 2, col. 2 (these remarks were made off the 
record). 
